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On the Marginal Cost of Public Funds for Argentina: CGE 
Evaluation and Sensitivity to Regulatory Regimes 
 
Abstract. We estimate the Marginal Cost of Public Funds for Argentina using a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model, assessing the sensitivity of the results to the existence of 
alternative regulatory regimes (Price-Cap and Cost-Plus) for public utilities subject to 
regulation. Although the estimates are in the range of international studies, we find that the 
results are sensitive to the regulatory regime, to the presence of exempted goods, the 
existence of unemployment, the value of the elasticity of labor supply, as well as to the degree 
of capital mobility, between sectors and internationally. 
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1. Introduction 
The Marginal Cost of Public Funds (MCPF) measures the change in social welfare that is 
generated by a marginal increase in tax revenue. Consequently, a public project must produce 
marginal benefits higher than the MCPF to be welfare improving. Holding public revenue 
constant, welfare can be increased by reducing taxes with the highest MCPF and increasing 
those with the lowest MCPF. Therefore, estimates of the MCPF can provide guidelines for 
reform of tax structures and help to choose how to finance public projects. 
In this paper, we compute the MCPF for Argentina by implementing a Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model calibrated to the year 2004.  
An exploration of the most important literature on the MCPF shows that it is usually 
computed assuming that there are no regulated sectors in the economy. On the other hand, the 
literature on regulation assumes that the MCPF is independent of the regulatory regime (for 
example, see the Laffont and Tirole’s 1993 classical text). Here we analyze the interaction 
between the tax system and the regulatory regime. This is important because regulated sectors 
represent a significant share of total GDP in Argentina. We also compare the effects of a 
change in the tax system under different regulatory regimes and test the sensitivity of our 
results to different specifications for the labor market (i.e., full employment and 
unemployment), and to alternative assumptions on factor mobility between sectors and 
between the domestic economy and the rest of the world.  
The paper is organized as follows. Next section is devoted to a brief discussion of the 
literature on the calculation of the MCPF in developing and developed countries. Section 3 
explains how a CGE model can be adapted to consider two alternative regulatory regimes: 
Price-Cap and Cost-Plus. Section 4 presents a description of our CGE model. In Section 5 we 
report our main results and present estimates of the MCPF under different assumptions. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes. In Appendix A we develop a simple model that helps to 
illustrate the interaction between the tax system and the regulatory regime, and in Appendix B 
we present the mathematical statement of the CGE model.   -5-
2. Literature on the MCPF 
Pigou (1928) was the first in presenting a formal analysis of the MCPF. He argued that, even 
though the government uses taxes to collect revenue, it must consider the cost of these 
resources in terms of the distortions introduced in order to evaluate the optimal level of public 
spending.
1 According to Pigou, the public sector differs from the rest of the economic agents 
because its revenue is not derived from a voluntary exchange but by the state power. 
Those distortions create a deadweight loss or welfare cost that, according to Feldstein (1997), 
depends on the elasticities of the labor and capital supply (hours worked, job type, human 
capital accumulation, and so on), the composition of the consumption basket, and the 
propensity to save. As we show below, all these elements have an important role in CGE 
calculations, and of course in our own estimates. 
Browning (1976) explains that “the marginal cost of public funds is the social opportunity 
cost of government spending”. He shows that the marginal cost of public funds includes any 
expenditure that arises from the tax system. Following this, it can be said that there is a more 
comprehensive definition of MCPF, one that includes the administrative costs of revenue, and 
other “hidden costs” like tax evasion and corruption (Usher, 1991). However, the lack of data, 
especially in LDCs, constitutes an important barrier to have estimates that include all these 
effects. 
Ballard and Fullerton (1992) distinguish two methods to calculate the MCPF. According to 
the first one, known as the Pigou-Harberger-Browning approach, one has to compare 
distortions in the tax system with an equal-revenue lump-sum tax (a rebate to taxpayers).
2 
                                                 
1 “Expenditure should be pushed in all directions up to the point at which the satisfaction obtained from the last 
shilling expended is equal to the satisfaction lost in respect to the last shilling called up on government service” 
(Pigou, 1947). 
2 Musgrave (1954) takes a “differential analysis” view to calculate the MCPF. Depending on the assumptions, 
this approach can also be included in the “Balanced-Budget Analysis” if we assume that the government 
provides private goods publicly. As Browning (1987) poses it, “if the marginal government spending provides 
benefits that are a perfect substitute for the disposable income of taxpayers, then the spending as only an income 
effect that is equivalent to a lump sum transfer… This may be large correct in case involving government 
provision of schooling, medical care, pensions, and other things taxpayers would purchase with their disposable 
income if the government did not provide them”. However, as Atkinson and Stern (1974) note, the level of   -6-
This approach is more concerned with the structure of the tax system than with the overall 
level of taxation. The second method, the so-called Stiglitz-Dasgupta-Atkinson-Stern 
approach (Stiglitz and Dasgupta, 1971), states that the MCPF not only depends on the 
substitution effect but also on the income effect. It assumes that the increase in revenue is 
used to finance public projects (which are independent of the supply of labor).
3 Atkinson and 
Stern (1974) point out that the MCPF can be decomposed into the substitution and income 
effects, which they call the “distortionary effect” and the “revenue effect”, respectively. The 
“distortionary effect” is the deadweight loss mentioned above. The “revenue effect” depends 
on the outcome of the “income effect” on tax revenue.
4  
Our paper relies on the Pigou-Harberger-Browning approach to calculate the MCPF. In 
particular, we use Browning’s (1976) approach by assuming that increases in public spending 
are considered as lump-sum transfers to private agents. 
However, it will be seen that the MCPF can be less than one in our calculations, as it happens 
in the Stiglitz-Dasgupta-Atkinson-Stern version. The reason is basically in the distributive 
story in an economy open to foreign capital, when tax rebates are restricted to reach only 
domestic agents. 
Since the publication of Harberger’s seminal work (Harberger, 1962), the number of studies 
that calculate the distortions induced by the tax system has grown considerably. The 
development of computational economics made it possible to use general equilibrium models 
to calculate the MCPF. Recently, Walters and Auriol (2005) have estimated the MCPF for 
several African countries using a small CGE model. Table 1 summarizes several estimations.  
                                                                                                                                                          
complementarity of public spending and private spending will be determined by the type of goods that the public 
sector provides. If the government provides public goods, public spending will complement private goods and 
Browning’s argument does not hold.  
3 With this method the “balanced-budget analysis” approach (Musgrave, 1954) prevails, which incorporates the 
increase in government spending in calculating the MCPF.  
4 Ballard and Fullerton (1992) claim that “Since the income effect of wage taxation increases work effort and 
therefore increases government revenue, it works toward a lower marginal cost of public funds”.   -7-
They are not directly comparable as their methodologies differ, but we can see that appraisals 
re in a range that goes from 0.48 (when there is a marginal benefit of public funds) up to 2.65. 
We will see that our results for Argentina are in that range.  
Table 1: Estimations of the marginal cost of public funds 
Country Tax Instrument Estimate Source
Australia Labor 1.19-1.24 Campbell and Bond (1997)
Australia Labor 1.28-1.55 Findlay and Jones (1982)
Australia Capital 1.21-1.48 Diewert and Lawrence (1998)
Australia Capital 1.15-1.51 Benge (1999)
Bangladesh Sales 0.95-1.07 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Bangladesh Imports 1.17-2.18 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Cameroon Sales 0.48-0.96 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Cameroon Imports 1.05-1.37 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Canada Commodities 1.25 Campbell (1975)
Canada Labor 1.38 Dahlby (1994)
Canada Labor 1.39-1.53 Fortin and Lacroix (1994)
China Sales 2.31 Laffont and Senik-Leygonie (1997)
India Excise 1.66-2.15 Ahmad and Stern (1987)
India Sales 1.59-2.12 Ahmad and Stern (1987)
India Imports 1.54-2.17 Ahmad and Stern (1987)
Indonesia Sales 0.97-1.11 Devarajan et al. (2001)
Indonesia Imports 0.99-1.18 Devarajan et al. (2001)
New Zeland Labor 1.18 Diewert and Lawrence (1994)
Switzerland  All taxes 1.69-2.29 Hansson and Stuart (1985)
United States All taxes 1.17-1.56 Ballard et al. (1985)
United States Labor 1.21-1.24 Stuart (1984)
United States Labor 1.32-1.47 Browning (1987)
United States All taxes 1.47 Jorgenson and Yun (1990)
United States Labor 1.08-1.14 Ahmed and Croushore (1994)
United States All taxes 2.65 Feldstein (1997)
United States All taxes 1.23 Diewert et al. (1998)
United States All taxes 1.07 Browning (1976)
United States All taxes 1.18 Browning (1976)
Source: Author's elaboration and Warlters and Auriol (2005).  
As we mentioned above, we investigate whether the calculation of the MCPF should consider 
the existence of alternative regulatory regimes. The literature on the economics of regulation 
assumes that the MCPF is independent of the regulatory regime (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). 
However, the MCPF is very important in the choice of the power of incentives of the 
regulatory regime; if the MCPF is low, then the cost of transfers to an inefficient provider of   -8-
services is also relatively small. We will see that the hypothesis of independence of the MCPF 
with respect to the regulatory regime can be challenged; particularly, when dealing with 
economies where high distortionary levels of taxation are already present and when these 
economies are open to the rest of the world. This is interesting also because it can be read in 
the opposite direction: if the MCPF varies according to the regulatory regime, the design of 
the optimal regulatory framework will have to take into account that information. 
3. Computational representation of price-cap and cost-plus 
under service obligation 
The literature on regulatory regimes under asymmetries of information assumes that the 
MCPF is independent of the regulatory regime
5, and proceeds to select the optimal power of 
incentives under that assumption. We use our model to evaluate if that assumption is 
reasonable for a real economy in which regulated sectors represent a significant share of GDP. 
Progress in the economics of regulation in the last 30 years is overwhelming.
6 In the new 
regulatory economics, information has the role of a scarce factor and the presence of 
asymmetric information generates rents and distortions that have private and social costs. The 
contractual link between the regulator and the regulated firm can be interpreted as a particular 
case of the broader relationship between the Principal and the Agent within a context of risk 
under asymmetric information.  
Both under “moral hazard” or “adverse selection” it is necessary to design a contract that 
balances risk sharing with information disclosure. In most models, it is the Principal who 
                                                 
5 See for example Laffont and Tirole’s classical text (Laffont and Tirole, 1993). The reciprocal effect has been 
considered for example by Desai and Dharmapala (2004); they look at how the power of incentives to managers 
depends on the tax system.  
6 For example, the introduction of the revelation principle made an extraordinary simplification possible by 
showing that there is no loss of generality if the number of contacts is reduced as much as possible to the number 
of types of agents. A more general theory for natural monopolies (based on the subadditivity of costs to justify 
its existence) was developed, and Ramsey pricing was extended to take into account “revenue cap” and access 
fees. Additionally, the relationship between efficient regulation and income distribution was more firmly 
established (based on the concepts of service obligation and of universal service).   -9-
designs the contract, and the Agent who accepts or rejects it. The optimal contract is therefore 
obtained by maximizing the welfare of the Principal (almost always a risk neutral economic 
agent) subject to constraints that take into account the problem of utility maximization of the 
Agent. Firstly, the Agent (risk averse) must not obtain a reward (in terms of utility) lower than 
what she could obtain elsewhere in the economy (the Participation Constraint). Secondly, the 
Agent must not benefit from cheating about his characteristics or actions (the Incentive 
Compatibility Constraint). 
In this context, two “pure” methods are usually proposed to regulate the prices of licensed or 
privatized activities which are natural monopolies, Price-Cap and Cost-Plus regulation. Under 
the first one, the price of the product or service is fixed and the regulated firm faces all the 
risk. If costs rise, the regulator will not rescue the firm in any way (e.g., by raising the price or 
giving a direct subsidy to the firm). On the other hand, if costs fall, the firm will obtain profits 
to be distributed as dividends to shareholders. The Price-Cap regime reduces the cost of 
control by granting the firm a market incentive to maximize efficiency in its internal 
processes. However, and though it reduces the rents from asymmetric information, the Price-
Cap regime increases the risk premium necessary to induce the firm’s participation. In 
contrast, under the Cost-Plus regime, the firm is assured a certain rate of return as the 
regulator rescues the firm in the case of a negative shock; but the ever-present risk makes it 
difficult to discriminate between increases in genuine and speculative costs. Therefore, the 
firm has no incentive to reduce costs and increase efficiency. This results in potential losses of 
efficiency and the need to collect revenue through distortionary taxes to cover the firm’s 
deficit.  
The MCPF gives an estimate of the losses in terms of allocation of resources due to that 
transfer or subsidy to the firm. In the literature on regulation, it is taken as a parameter and, 
once estimated, its value is used to determine the optimal power of incentives. What we do 
here is to test if the power of incentives could not in turn influence the actual value of the 
MCPF. 
In practice, none of those two methods for pricing regulated sectors is applied in Argentina in 
its purest versions. It can be said that Price-Cap prevails in the regulation of public utilities in 
Argentina; however, periodic reviews are conducted to approach regulated price to levels that   -10-
guarantee a “fair and reasonable” rate of return. Also, in most regulated sectors, costs are 
discriminated between those that are under control of the firm or beyond it. 
How do we represent those alternative regulatory regimes in our model?
7 The regulated 
sectors receive no special treatment with respect to their production technology. The 
difference with the rest of the sectors lies in the way in which the price of the product is 
defined and the treatment of the service obligation. In fact, we take advantage of the service 
obligation restriction to avoid the problem of rationing.
8 Under service obligation, the firm 
must satisfy all of the demand; depending on the case, it has two alternatives: (1) producing 
more with the available technology and capital stock but adding other factors (like labor), and 
absorbing the difference between the fixed price and the average cost; or (2) using an 
alternative technology with constant returns to scale that allows an increase in the capital 
stock with an average cost that is similar to the fixed price.  











In the first case, as a consequence of the service obligation restriction, the firm can have a 
loss. In that case, a (negative) tax on the firm’s shareholders resolves the problem of the 
analytical formulation without violating the zero profit condition. If, instead, the demand level 
falls below the level that would support the regulated price, the model computes an ad-
                                                 
7 This discussion is based on Chisari, Estache and Romero (1999) and Chisari, Estache and Romero (2007). 
8 The concept of universal service is more demanding; the price must be low enough so that the target population 
can take advantage of the service. The price is not passive under service obligation.   -11-
valorem tax on the (Walrasian) price that the shareholders receive; the objective is reached if 
the price (pR
1) plus tax t gives the fixed price P (Figure 1). When the regulation is by Cost-
Plus, the tax (to or from the shareholders) helps to maintain the “fair and reasonable” rate of 
return. Summarizing, the tax rate is determined as another endogenous variable according to 
one of the following conditions: (1) the real price for the firm is kept constant, or (2) the real 
rate of return for the firm is kept constant. Notice that in the case of a Price-Cap regulatory 
regime, the return to the installed capital will adjust until profits are exhausted.
9 
We should also keep in mind that this way of representing the regulatory regimes has 
analogies with an endogenous determination of a tax rate, whose recipient is at times the 
public sector, and at times the firm’s shareholders. We can rely therefore on the already 
available proofs of existence of a general equilibrium with taxes.
10  
4. The CGE model 
This section uses a CGE model of the Argentine economy calibrated with a 2004 Social 
Accounting Matrix to estimate the MCPF. Our model is based on Chisari et al (2006). It is a 
static small open economy CGE model with an endogenous labor supply and unemployment 
generated by a downward rigid real wage. Products are differentiated according to their 
country of origin (Armington, 1969), and consequently imports are an imperfect substitute of 
domestic production. Among the primary factors of production, labor is mobile between 
sectors while capital is sector-specific. The model distinguishes the following four uses for 
domestic production: intermediate (firms), final (households and government), investment 
(private and public), and exports (rest of the world). This differentiation makes it possible to 
take into account the functioning of the Argentine tax system. Specifically, we can model the 
value added tax avoiding the cascading effect on intermediate transactions. Each household 
has a nested CES utility function defined over consumption of commodities and leisure. The 
institutional savings can be used for purchasing a capital good (i.e., real investment), or bonds 
                                                 
9 The question remains whether the firm would not prefer a value below P. For the range of the accepted 
parameters in our model and for the magnitude of the shocks considered, the price-cap was always operative.  
10 Shoven and Whalley (1973) give a demonstration while Ginsburgh and Keyzer (1997)  present a summary of 
the literature.   -12-
(i.e., financial investment). In order to compute the MCPF we assume that government 
consumption and savings are fixed in real terms and, consequently, any change in tax revenue 
is transferred to households as a lump sum. 
Figure 2 sums up the structure of the model for the production side that is utilized for final 
consumption (i.e., household and government consumption). The other destinations for 
domestic production are modeled in the same way. Figure 3 presents the decomposition of 
households’ expenses in consumption goods (traditional utility function), investment in 
physical assets (indicated as “Investment”) and in financial instruments (called “Savings”). 
The government, as well as the rest of the world, is modeled as a household. The bottom part 
of each box shows the corresponding variable in the model mathematical statement. The 
following abbreviations are used for the functional forms: LF stands for Leontief, CD for 
Cobb-Douglas, and CES for Constant Elasticity of Substitution. The figure shows, for 
example, that labor and capital are combined with a Cobb-Douglas production function to 
produce value added. See Appendix B for a detailed presentation of the model. 
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In order to calibrate the model we built a SAM for Argentina as of year 2004 (see Table 5 for 
an aggregated SAM). As our starting point to build the SAM we used the 1997 (latest 
available) input-ouput tables constructed by the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses 
(INDEC, 2001) combined with more recent information from official sources and our own 
estimates.
11 The SAM was balanced by using the Cross Entropy estimation technique; we 
imposed constraints to the balancing process based on known macroeconomic data. 
The economic activity is disaggregated in 29 sectors. For these sectors, output is exported or 
sold domestically, competing with imports. The SAM identifies three types of labor: formal 
salaried workers, informal salaried workers, and non-salaried workers. The remaining 
productive factor is physical capital. The institutions accounts include the government, a 
household (i.e, the private domestic institution), and the rest of the world. Each institution 
saves in bonds issued by the other institutions and invests in physical capital. Tax accounts 
                                                 
11 A full description of the SAM building process can be requested to the authors.   -14-
were disaggregated into eight taxes as shown in Table 6.
12 There is one private investment 
account and one public investment accounts. Sectors Electricity, gas and water, Transport, 
and Communications are subject to a regulatory regime. They represent about 10.5% of total 
value added (see Table 7).  
Table 5: Aggregated SAM Argentina 2004 
(in billions of pesos) 
act com lab cap hhd gov row s-i total
act 772 772
com 352 257 50 115 63 836
lab 91 91
cap 248 248
hhd 91 223 60 373
gov 37 64 14 5 120
r o w 4 42 5 1 82 0 1 0 8
s-i 84 11 -8 88
total 772 836 91 248 373 120 108 88
Source: SAM Argentina 2004.  
Table 6: Tax revenue Argentina 2004 
billion $ % total % GDP
Value added 24.88 20.7 5.7
Turnover 11.56 9.6 2.7
Labor 16.27 13.5 3.8
Capital 19.24 16.0 4.4
Income 11.41 9.5 2.6
Tariffs 3.17 2.6 0.7
Exports 8.71 7.2 2.0
Other indirect 19.06 15.8 4.4
TOTAL 114.29 94.9 26.4




                                                 
12 Notice that, in the model, some of these taxes are aggregated into an indirect tax.   -15-
Table 7: Sectoral share in value added  
(in %) 
Formal Informal Non-wage
Non-regulated 90.8 88.6 90.8 89.0 89.5
Regulated 9.2 11.4 9.2 11.0 10.5
Electricity, gas and water 2.4 0.0 2.4 1.7 1.7
Transport 4.4 11.4 4.4 6.2 6.2
Communications 2.4 0.0 2.4 3.1 2.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0







5. Calculating the MCPF for Argentina 
In order to compute the MCPF, we assume that the government keeps constant its expenses in 
commodities, bonds (issued by the households and the rest of the world), and physical 
investment. Therefore, as mentioned above, the additional tax revenue is redistributed to the 
households as a lump-sum transfer.  
In all our simulation we will assume that the marginal revenue is collected by increasing tax 




























where EV is the equivalent variation and TREV0 (TREV) is the initial (counterfactual) tax 
revenue. The value of the additional tax revenue is subtracted from the change in welfare 
because the MCPF measures the cost of taxation and not the benefit of public spending. We 
compute the MCPF under different assumptions in the following experiments: 
•  Experiment 1 (E1). In this simulation we assume full employment (labor supply elasticity 
is high, estimated at 0.25) and that all regulated sectors (i.e., Electricity, gas and water, 
Transport and Communications) are subject to the incremental tax rate. Regulated prices 
are fixed in terms of foreign currency (i.e., WFSTAR in the Appendix B). This is our base   -16-
simulation; in simulations 2-8 we test the sensitivity of our results to different 
assumptions. 
•  Experiment 2 (E2-unemp). This is similar to E1 under the assumption that the existence of 
unemployment is due to a downward rigid real wage rate (i.e., in terms of the consumer 
price index). 
•  Experiment 3 (E3-exclu). In this simulation some sectors are excluded from the increase 
in the tax rates. This simulation is motivated by the existence of sectors with different 
degrees of formality or that are untaxed because of economic policy or social reasons. We 
considered two variants of this experiment. In alternative 1, the excluded sectors are Food 
industry, beverages and tobacco, Education, and Health. In alternative 2, the excluded 
sectors are the regulated sectors.  
•  Experiment 4 (E4-regul). The number of regulated sectors is increased. We assumed that 
the regulated sectors are Electricity, gas and water, Transport, Communications, Food 
industry, beverages and tobacco, Education, and Health. 
•  Experiment 5 (E5-elas). The elasticity of labor supply is decreased to 0.10. This 
experiment tests the sensitivity of our results to the value of a key parameter in the 
computation of deadweight losses. 
•  Experiment 6 (E6-cpi). In this case regulated prices are indexed to the retail price index 
(i.e., CPI). 
•  Experiment 7 (E7-mobcap). We assume that 40% of the capital factor is perfectly mobile 
between sectors. The objective is to compare a long-run versus a short-run situation. 
Notice that, in this scenario, the tax on capital is paid by the specific as well as the mobile 
capital. 
•  Experiment 8 (E8-rowcap). A 40% of the capital factor is internationally mobile. We 
assess how the MCPF will change if capital is able leave the domestic country when taxes 
are increased. The tax is paid by the both types of capital. 
Table 8 compares the calculation of the MCPF of the following five taxes included in the 
model: turnover, on labor, on capital, value added, and income. The MCPF of each tax is 
computed under three different scenarios: (i) no regulation; (ii) regulation by Price-Cap; and 
(iii) regulation by Cost-Plus.    -17-
Table 8: Results of the MCPF calculation under different assumptions 
Scenario E1 E2-unemp E3-exclu1 E3-exclu2 E4-regul
MCPF turnover tax
No regulation 1.02711 1.37655 1.03167 1.02618 1.02711
Regulation by Price-Cap 0.98998 1.19275 0.98780 1.01393 0.90536
Regulation by Cost-Plus 1.02690 1.37562 1.03129 1.02638 1.02645
MCPF labor tax
No regulation 1.13387 4.17594 1.14989 1.11279 1.13387
Regulation by Price-Cap 1.11091 3.51166 1.10590 1.22550 1.10819
Regulation by Cost-Plus 1.13408 4.17393 1.15057 1.10984 1.13174
MCPF capital tax
No regulation 0.84286 0.72413 0.84281 0.84283 0.84286
Regulation by Price-Cap 0.83169 0.67158 0.83163 0.83165 0.81725
Regulation by Cost-Plus 0.84286 0.72413 0.84281 0.84283 0.84287
MCPF value added tax
No regulation 1.15920 1.53137 1.17242 1.16535 1.15920
Regulation by Price-Cap 1.09209 1.25767 1.09743 1.14068 0.96335
Regulation by Cost-Plus 1.15892 1.53042 1.17181 1.16641 1.15898
MCPF income tax
No regulation 1.08526 0.92596 1.08526 1.08526 1.08526
Regulation by Price-Cap 1.08382 0.92748 1.08382 1.08382 1.08025
Regulation by Cost-Plus 1.08533 0.92603 1.08533 1.08533 1.08529
MCPF all previous taxes
No regulation 1.06392 1.45351 1.06780 1.05982 1.06392
Regulation by Price-Cap 1.02771 1.27261 1.02704 1.05662 0.95971
Regulation by Cost-Plus 1.06380 1.45289 1.06760 1.05996 1.06318
Source: Author's computations.    -18-
Table 8: Results of the MCPF calculation under different assumptions – Cont. 
Scenario E1 E5-elas E6-cpi E7-mobcap E8-rowcap
MCPF turnover tax
No regulation 1.02711 1.01246 1.02711 1.02949 1.10813
Regulation by Price-Cap 0.98998 0.97798 1.01074 1.00129 1.06626
Regulation by Cost-Plus 1.02690 1.01227 1.02654 1.02931 1.10781
MCPF labor tax
No regulation 1.13387 1.05460 1.13387 1.13549 1.16920
Regulation by Price-Cap 1.11091 1.03830 1.11871 1.12464 1.15014
Regulation by Cost-Plus 1.13408 1.05479 1.13388 1.13549 1.16918
MCPF capital tax
No regulation 0.84286 0.83535 0.84286 0.86614 1.09104
Regulation by Price-Cap 0.83169 0.82519 0.83155 0.86867 1.08682
Regulation by Cost-Plus 0.84286 0.83535 0.84286 0.86610 1.09028
MCPF value added tax
No regulation 1.15920 1.14459 1.15920 1.16229 1.17435
Regulation by Price-Cap 1.09209 1.08127 1.13770 1.10661 1.11158
Regulation by Cost-Plus 1.15892 1.14433 1.15779 1.16215 1.17420
MCPF income tax
No regulation 1.08526 1.07088 1.08526 1.08012 1.09724
Regulation by Price-Cap 1.08382 1.06996 1.07822 1.07983 1.09611
Regulation by Cost-Plus 1.08533 1.07095 1.08542 1.08014 1.09725
MCPF all previous taxes
No regulation 1.06392 1.04253 1.06392 1.08416 1.10980
Regulation by Price-Cap 1.02771 1.00954 1.04687 1.05447 1.07339
Regulation by Cost-Plus 1.06380 1.04244 1.06339 1.08400 1.10961
Source: Author's computations.  
It can be seen that our estimates for the MCPF are in the range of those estimated in the 
literature. We can also say that the results show sensitivity to the elasticities of factor supply, 
the relative size of the regulated sector, the distortion generated by the regulatory regime in 
the commodity markets, and the presence or not of foreign shareholders (international capital 
mobility). 
We can summarize the results as follows. 
1.  The MCPF moves in the range of 0.67 to 1.50, depending on the type of tax used to 
increase the revenue of the government, and the assumption on price regulation. The 
only exception is the case of taxes on labor under unemployment; in that case, the loss 
of jobs increases the MCPF beyond the expected range.   -19-
2.  There are differences in the estimated level of the MCPF for alternative regulatory 
regimes. Let us focus our attention first on experiment E1, the basic case. Price-Cap 
regulation will reduce deadweight losses with respect to a Cost-Plus regime. The 
results show, for example, that collecting one additional peso by increasing the value 
added tax will produce a welfare loss equivalent to 16 cents when no sectors are 
regulated. Instead, when sectors Electricity, gas and water, Transport, and 
Communications are regulated by a price-cap mechanism, the MCPF will be 
decreased to 9 cents (see E1 for Value Added Tax).The MCPF varies with the 
regulatory regime but the bias is always in terms of reducing its level in the case of 
Price-Cap. In fact, the most important (absolute) difference with respect to the No 
Regulation scenario is observed for the Price-Cap regulatory regime. This result may 
be explained by the fact that, under Cost-Plus, capital owners do not absorb the burden 
of taxes, and this creates a higher cost in terms of distortions. On the contrary, when 
the regulation is by Price-Cap, the markets for goods are more isolated from the price 
increases due to increases in taxes. However, it could be expected that additional costs 
due to tax increases would be passed through to prices and actual results would be 
similar to the Cost-Plus case. Of course, these estimates have to be reconsidered in 
long-run scenarios. It is not realistic to expect that tax increases will not be passed 
through to (regulated) prices; however, final changes in relative prices and in costs of 
regulated firms could be difficult to calculate. Therefore, it can be expected that the 
actual result will be something between the extreme cases of Price-Cap and Cost-Plus. 
3.  The presence of exempted sectors increases the MCPF and the estimated differences 
between regulatory regimes. It can be observed that when some sectors are excluded 
from the increase in the tax rates, the differences between the MCPF with and without 
regulation are magnified. However, the differences of the MCPF between regimes 
depend also on the presence of already existing distortions and special treatments. 
4.  Those differences are more noticeable when regulated sectors are larger with respect 
to the rest of the economy. It is interesting to see, in Experiment 4 (E4-regul), that an 
increase in the number of sectors subject to regulation also increases the differences in 
the results by regime (it must be compared with E1). So, it is relevant to our results the 
relative size of the economy under regulation with respect to total GDP.   -20-
5.  The existence of unemployment increases MCPF. Unemployment implies that the loss 
of jobs is very costly for aggregated welfare. If additional taxes increase prices, our 
assumption is that nominal wages will grow to keep real wages constant, and this 
creates more unemployment. The results depend then on the assumption of wages 
indexation when markets are out of equilibrium. 
6.  The MCPF is lower when revenue is obtained through several taxes simultaneously 
instead of with only one tax. Notice also (last rows) that when several taxes are 
increased simultaneously the MCPF is lower than the MCPF for some of them, like 
the VAT. This result coincides with the findings of Warlters and Auriol (2005) and 
seems to be a “second best effect”; that is, there are distortions that get cancelled 
among themselves. 
7.  MCPF will be lower if labor supply is more inelastic. As expected, the reduction of 
the elasticity of labor supply reduces the magnitude of the distortions and therefore the 
MCPF level (see E5-elas). If we recall Feldstein (1997), one of the reasons for the 
existence of distortions is some positive elasticity for labor supply. Taxes impact on 
relative prices of goods and leisure and create a deadweight loss. 
8.  The MCPF increases when capital can move between sectors. As can be seen by 
comparing the base scenario (E1) and experiment E7-mobcap, the MCPF increases 
when part of the capital factor can move freely between sectors after increasing the tax 
rates. 
9.   The MCPF will be lower (or even negative) under Price-Cap when capital is not 
internationally immobile. And this calls attention to the sensitivity of results to the 
(external) closure rule of the model (i.e., if the economy is open to trade and capital 
movements or not). In the case of Argentina, some taxes show a negative MCPF (i.e., 
benefit). This can be seen for the case of taxation of capital income. This is not the 
first time it is observed (see also Warlters and Auriol (2005)). And it is explained by 
the fact that part of the tax burden is passed-through to foreign owners of capital. 
Clearly, this marginal benefit is unsustainable in a long run situation with full capital   -21-
mobility.
13 This is confirmed in experiment E8-rowcap; when a proportion of the 
capital is mobile between countries, the observed differences between regimes tend to 
be reduced. It is already known that domestic authorities could favor one regime or the 
other, and the corresponding power of incentives, depending on the share of foreign 
agents in total capital of regulated sectors. What our result shows is that the MCPF 
itself might depend on that participation. Consistently, the effort of the economy (in 
terms of exports with respect to GDP) must be lower under Price-Cap than under 
Cost-Plus, when there are tax increases; this is observed in the simulations because 
there is a lower transfer of dividends abroad. 
We also tested the sensitivity of our results to the increase in the tax rates (50% instead of 
10%) and to the value of the Armington elasticities (i.e., the degree of substitutability between 
domestic and imported goods). As expected, as we increase the nominal tax rate, the MCPF is 
also increased, suggesting that the marginal cost is higher than the average cost. And we can 
see that an increase in the Armington elasticities also increases the MCPF, since consumers 
are more able to substitute for imported goods their domestic consumption basket.  
                                                 
13 One finding that Chisari et al. (2003) obtained with a similar model is that differences exist in the performance 
required of the trade balance depending on the regulatory regime of the tariffs. If a firm is to achieve internal 
efficiency yields, for example, the price-cap regulation generates benefits that must eventually return the 
invested capital. It is highly probable that part of these dividends are legally transferred, as is their right, to the 
foreign owners or simply used to purchase foreign assets – a question of preference – even if the owners of the 
benefits are local. This must place greater pressure on the trade balance than a rate of return regulation, 
according to which the tariff would drop together with a drop in costs. The effect is not generally considered 
among the elements evaluated when deciding whether to opt for price-cap or cost-plus; what is considered is the 
problem of distortions arising from the taxes used to subsidize inefficient enterprises. The latter tends to favor 
the price cap; instead, the impact on the trade balance offers a convincing argument for the cost plus. There is an 
expected efficiency loss because cost plus does not control opportunism; this loss in efficiency could force up the 
level of imports if the input is not produced domestically. Note that we are comparing both possibilities.   -22-
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have evaluated the MCPF for Argentina using a computable general 
equilibrium model calibrated for a Social Accounting Matrix as of 2004. The estimates 
obtained are in the range of the results found in the literature for other countries.  
First of all, our results show that the MCPF depends on the type of tax used to increase 
revenue. Surprisingly, the VAT has a much higher MCPF than other taxes, like the sales tax, 
which are traditionally reckoned as more distortionary. The reason lies in the large differences 
that exist in the treatment of some sectors, and in the abundance of exemptions and special 
regimes. 
Additionally, the MCPF is sensitive to the type of regulation of prices used. The presence of 
price caps modifies the capacity of passing through taxes to customers and alters the workings 
of relative prices, but fundamentally creates implicit transfers from shareholders to customers. 
Instead, a cost-plus regime tends to mimic the results of the Walrasian solutions. This is 
important because not all regulations are applied to public services in LDCs. In fact, less 
developed economies are prone to use price controls (directly or by threat) as an instrument of 
economic policy and this makes that the share of sectors under regulation in total GDP 
become significant for a CGE model; in fact, we find that differences in MCPF according to 
the regime are amplified when price regulations are applicable on a wider portion of the 
economy.  
Finally, we tested the model to assess how it reacts to different elasticities of substitution 
between domestic and imported goods, between goods and leisure, to alternative degrees of 
capital mobility, and to the presence of unemployment. 
Of course, structural characteristics, parameters levels, and closure rules may change the 
results. However, the intuition for the case of Argentina has received confirmation from the 
structural model considered in this paper.  
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Appendix A. The interaction between the regulatory regime and the 
tax system: an example. 
Let us see how the regulatory regime (price-cap or cost-plus) can possibly interact with the 
tax system. First, suppose that the existing tax regime creates distortions in the decision 
between labor supply (or leisure demand) and consumption of the only good that is produced 
in the economy. Let us consider the following variations starting with a simple economy: 
a)  An economy without taxes and regulation. 
b)  An economy with a consumption tax. 
c)  An economy with a consumption tax and a price-cap regulation. 
d)  The same economy as in (c) but with a cost-plus regulation. 
The size of the distortion generated by the tax system or regulatory regime can be 
approximated by the differences in the employment level. Our simple economy can be 











  () ( ) L w s c p t B L w c t p . . . . . 1 − + + = +  (2) 
  () ( ) s L w L F p B − − = 1 . .  (3) 
  () ( ) s w L F p − = 1 ' .  (4) 
  () L F c =  (5) 
  L T O − =  (6) 
Equation (1) corresponds to the marginal rate of transformation between consumption and 
leisure with the price ratio corrected by taxes. Equation (2) is the budget constraint of the only 
agent in the economy where B refers to the profits of the only industry. Notice that the last 
term on the right hand side refers to the agent’s total income including tax revenue (t.p.c) net 
of the “implicit tax” (s.w.L) defined by the regulatory regime. Both taxes and compensatory 
taxes derived from the regulatory regime are redistributed to the agent as a lump sum, as is 
common in traditional studies on tax incidence.   -26-
Equation (3) defines the firm’s profits while equation (4) gives the conditions of maximum 
profit. Equation (5) is the market equilibrium condition for the consumer good. Finally, 
equation (6) determines leisure demand. 
Let us call First Best (FB) to the solution that is obtained solving the system for  0 ts ==. In 
this case, five independent equations will exist (with equation (2) implicitly determined by the 
other five) in the endogenous variables c, O, p, L, and B. We select the wage rate as 
numeraire by fixing its value equal to one. To obtain a numerical solution for the model, let us 
suppose that the utility function is  ( )
2 1 2 1 L T c u − = , T = 1, and  ( )
b L L F =  with  1 0 < < b . 
Substituting, we obtain the following results for each of the above four cases.  
Case (a): first best 
From equations (1) and (5) we have ( )
b L p c p L . . 1 = = − . From equation (4) we have 
1 . .
1 =
− b L c p . This means that  b L L p
b = . . Therefore, L must satisfy the that  b L L = − 1 . 










Case (b): consumption tax and no regulation 
The procedure is similar to the above but we now have ( ) ( )













Note that the introduction of taxes reduces employment with respect to the first best solution: 
L
T < L
FB. That is, in this simplified model we can focus our attention only on the labor 
market. 
Case (c): consumption tax and price-cap 
Under the price-cap regime, the price of the good is limited by the condition that  θ ≤ w p  
where θ  is determined by the regulatory authority. Assume that this condition is operative 
since the firm will never choose a price that is lower than the maximum level that was   -27-
granted. Thus, we have  θ = p . Given that we have lost an endogenous variable, the implicit 
subsidy “s” to be paid by the shareholders is made endogenous to replace the price. 
Therefore, from equations (1) and (5) we have  ( )
b L t L + + = 1 1 θ . It is always possible to find a 
solution since, when L = 0, the left hand side of the equation is null. When L tends to T = 1, 
the right hand side is larger than the left. The explicit solution for L is more difficult. Let us 
take a lineal approximation  ( ) 1 1 − + = L b L
b  in L
0 = 1. Then, 












which shows an interaction between the distortion given by ( ) t + 1  and the regulatory regime 
given byθ . 
Case (d): consumption tax and cost-plus 
Again, we take “s” as one more endogenous variable. This is because of the addition of a new 







Equation (3) is now written as ( ) s L L p L G
b − − = 1 . . . From equations (1) and (4) we obtain the 
























Remember that the presence of subsidies as part of the regulatory mechanism demands the 
confirmation that the agents’ net income does not turn negative. Note that the subsidies 
granted to the firm as a way to incentive production is deducted as a lump-sum from the 
agent’s income.  
   -28-
Appendix B. The CGE model mathematical statement 
This Appendix presents the CGE model mathematical statement. The following notation is 
used: upper case letters for endogenous variables, lower case letters for exogenous variables, 
and Greek letters stand for behavioral parameters. When a variable name is followed by zero, 
it refers to an initial value (i.e., reported by the SAM). The following indexes are used: s for 
goods or sectors (each sector produces only one good), f for factors, b for bonds, i for 
institutions, and h for households. Quantity (respectively price) variables are identified with 
an initial Q (respectively P for Price variables). 
Variables 
Quantities 
  s QAGOV   Armington composite good s in gov utility (consumption) 
  sh QAHHD   Armington composite good s in hhd h utility (consumption) 
  ' ss QAINT   Armington composite good s in intermediate consumption sector 
s´. 
  s QAINV   Armington composite good s in private investment 
  s QAINVG   Armington composite good s in public investment 
  s QAROW   Armington composite good s in row utility (consumption) 
  ib QBONDENDOW   bond b endowment of institution i 
  b QBONDGOV   gov bond b demand   
  bh QBONDHHD   demand for bond b hhd h 
  b QBONDROW   demand for bond b row 
  V QBONDTOTGO   savings in bonds gov 
  h D QBONDTOTHH   savings in bonds hhd h   -29-
  W QBONDTOTRO   savings in bonds row 
  h QCONHHD   total (goods) consumption hhd h 
  s QDGOV   demand domestic good s in gov utility 
  sh QDHHD   demand domestic good s in hhd h utility 
  ' ss QDINT   demand domestic good s in intermediate consumption sector sp 
  s QDINV   demand domesic good s in private investment 
  s QDINVG   demand domestic good s in public investment 
  s QDROW   demand domestic good s in row utility 
  s QDUEXP   production domestic good s for export 
  s QDUFIN   production domestic good s for final consumption 
  s QDUINT   production domestic good s for intermediate consumption 
  s QDUINV   production domestic good s for investment 
  fs QF   demand factor f by sector s 
  s QFSTAR   demand factor fstar by (foreign) producer of imported good s 
  W QFSTARENDO   endowment factor f row 
  if QFACSUP   supply factor f by institution i 
  QGTRAN   demand gov transfers by gov 
  i W QGTRANENDO   endowment gov transfers by institution i 
  s QINTA   intermediate inputs composite used in sector s 
  s QINTAUEXP   intermediate inputs for use in production for export good s 
  s QINTAUFIN   intermediate inputs for use in production for final consumption 
good s   -30-
  s QINTAUINT   intermediate inputs used in production for intermediate 
consuption good s 
  s QINTAUINV   intermediate inputs for use in production for investment good s 
  QINVGOV   investment demand by gov 
  h QINVHHD   investment demand by hhd h 
  QINVROW   investment demand by row (rest of the world) 
  hf QLEISURE   demand for leisure of factor f by hhd h 
  s QMGOV   demand for imported good s in gov utility 
  sh QMHHD   demand for imported good s in hhd h utility 
  ' ss QMINT   demand for imported good s in intermediate consumption sector 
s´ 
  s QMINV   demand for imported good s in private investment 
  s QMINVG   demand for imported good s in public investment 
  s QMROW   demand for imported good s in r.o.w. utility 
  s QMTOT   production imported good s  
  f QUNEMP   unemployment  level of factor f 
  QUTGOV  gov  utility 
  h QUTHHD   hhd h utility 
  QUTINV   private investment production 
  QUTINVG  public  investment  production 
  QUTROW  r.o.w.  utility 
  s QVA   value added in sector s (all uses of domestic production) 
  s QVAUEXP   value added for use in export good s   -31-
  s QVAUFIN   value added for use in final consumption good s 
  s QVAUINT   value added for use in intermediate consumption good s 
  s QVAUINV   value added for use in investment good s 
Prices 
  CPI   consumer domestic price index 
  CPIARMING  consumer (Armington) price index 
  s PAGOV  price  QAGOV 
  sh PAHHD   price QAHHD hhd h 
  ' ss PAINT  price  QAINT 
  s PAINV  price  QAINV 
  s PAINVG  price  QAINVG 
  s PAROW  price  QAROW 
  b PBOND  price  bonds  b 
  h D PBONDTOTHH   price QBONDTOTHHD hhd h 
  V PBONDTOTGO  price  QBONDTOTGOV 
  W PBONDTOTRO  price  QBONDTOTROW 
  h PCONHHD   price QCONHHD hhd h 
  PGTRAN  price  QGTRAN 
  s PINTA  price  QINTA 
  s PM   price imported good s 
  s PUEXP  price  QDUEXP 
  s PUFIN  price  QDUFIN   -32-
  s PUINT  price  QDUINT 
  s PUINV  price  QDUINV 
  PUTGOV  price  QUTGOV 
  h PUTHHD   price QUTHHD hhd h 
  PUTINV  price  QUTINV 
  PUTINVG  price  QUTINVG 
  PUTROW  price  QUTROW 
  s PVA  price  QVA 
  f WF   wage of factor f 
  fs WFDIF   wage of factor f in sector s 
  f WFREAL   real wage rate factor f 
  WFSTAR   wage of factor fstar in imports production 
Incomes 
  YGOV  income  gov 
  h YHHD  income  hhd  h 
  YROW  income  row 
Tax revenue 
  TREV  tax  revenue 
Rate of unemployment 
  f U   rate of unemployment of factor f 
Regulatory regimes (equivalent taxes) 
  fs REGF   ad-valorem tax used to regulate wage factor f (cost-plus)   -33-
  s REGAUINT   a-v.t. used to regulate price good s for intermediate consumption 
(price-cap) 
  s REGAUFIN   a-v.t. used to regulate price good s for final consumption (price-
cap) 
  s REGAUINV   a-v.t. used to regulate price of good s for investment (price-cap) 
  s REGAUEXP   a-v.t. used to regulate price of good s for export (price-cap) 
  TRANREGF   a-v.t. transfer (implicit tax collection) due  to regulation  to wage 
of factor f (cost-plus) 
  TRANREGA  a-v.t. transfer (implicit tax collection) due to regulation to price 
of good s (price-cap) 
  s PUINTREAL   real price of good s for intermediate consumption 
  s PUFINREAL   real price of good s for final consumption 
  s PUINVREAL   real price of good s for investment 
  s PUEXPREAL   real price of good s for export 
  fs WFDIFREAL   real wage of factor f in sector s 
  s R PUINTWFSTA   real price of good s for intermediate consumption in terms of 
WFSTAR 
  s R PUFINWFSTA   real price of good s for final consumption in terms of WFSTAR 
  s R PUINVWFSTA   real price of good s for investment in terms of WFSTAR 
  s R PUEXPWFSTA   real price of good s for export in terms of WFSTAR 
  fs R WFDIFWFSTA   real wage of factor f in sector s in terms of WFSTAR 
Closure rule for government 
  FIXGBOND  if flex QGBONDTOTGOV is fixed 
  FIXGCON   if flex QUTGOV is fixed   -34-
  FIXGINV   if flex QINVGOV is fixed 
Closure rule for r.o.w. 
  FIXBONDROW   if flex QBONDROW is fixed 
Equations 
Value added block 
Equations (1) and (2) are the first order conditions (FOC) in the firm cost minimization 
problem for mobile and specific factors, respectively. Equation (3) is the Cobb-Douglas value 
added production function. The parameter chgtec(f,s) can be used to model a factor-specific 
technical change in a particular sector. 
  ( ) s s
VA
fs fs fs fs f QVA PVA QF REGF tf WF α = + + 1   fmovil f ∈  (1) 
  ( ) s s
VA
fs fs fs fs fs QVA PVA QF REGF tf WFDIF α = + + 1   fespec f ∈  (2) 






fs QF chgtec QVA
α β  (3) 
Intermediate inputs block 
Equations (4) and (5) are the FOC for the intermediate input demand. Equations (6) to (9) 
refer to the choice between domestic and imported intermediate inputs following the usual 
assumption of product differentiation according to their country of origin (Armington, 1969). 
A CES function is used to model imperfect substitutability between imports and domestic 
commodities (equation (6)).
1415 Equation (7) shows the tangency condition that determines the 
optimal mix between domestic and imported commodities. Equation (9) computes the supply 
price of the composite commodity as a weighted average of the domestic and imported prices. 
In equations (7) and (9) tmuint is the tariff faced by firms. 
                                                 
14 Additionally, the choice between domestic and imported varieties of the same good for intermediate 
consumption can be made according to a Leontief function. 
15 The substitution elasticity between domestic commodities and imports is ( ) 1 1 − = c c q ρ σ .   -35-
When  0
0
' > s s QMINT  and  0
0
' > s s QDINT , the model includes equations (6) and (7). 
Alternatively, if  0
0
' = s s QMINT  or  0
0
' = s s QDINT , the model includes equation (8). 
  ' ' ' s ss ss QINTA io QAINT =  (4) 
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=  (7) 
  s s s s s s QDINT QMINT QAINT ' ' ' + =  (8) 
  () s s s s s s s s s s s s QDINT PUINT QMINT tmint PM QAINT PAINT ' ' ' ' ' ' ' 1 + + =  (9) 
Intermediate use block 
Domestic production for intermediate consumption is a Leontief (i.e., fixed coefficients) 
function of the quantities of value added (equation (10)) and an aggregate intermediate input 
(equation (11)).
16 The price of value added is calculated, implicitly, in equation (12); the rest 
of the variables are determined elsewhere in the model. The taxes faced by the domestic 
production for intermediate consumption are (1) the activity tax (rate tauint), (2) the turnover 
tax (rate tiibbuint), and (3) the value added tax (usually, rate tivauint is zero). 
  s s s QDUINT ivauint QVAUINT =  (10) 
  s s s QDUINT intuint QINTAUINT =  (11) 
  ()
() s s s s s
s s s s s
QINTAUINT PINTA QVAUINT tivauint PVA
QDUINT REGAUINT tiibbuint tauint PUINT
+ +




                                                 
16 Notice that the aggregate intermediate input used in all uses of the domestic production is “produced” in 
equation (4).   -36-
Final consumption block 
Domestic production for final consumption (i.e., households and government) is also a 
Leontief function of value added (equation (13)) and an aggregate intermediate input 
(equation (14)). The price of value added in the production for final consumption is computed 
in equation (15). 
  s s s QDUFIN ivaufin QVAUFIN =  (13) 
  s s s QDUFIN intufin QINTAUFIN =  (14) 
  ()
() s s s s s
s s s s s
QINTAUFIN PINTA QVAUFIN tivaufin PVA
QDUFIN REGAUFIN tiibbufin taufin PUFIN
+ +




Investment use block 
Domestic production for public and private investment is also a fixed coefficients function of 
value added (equation (16)) and an aggregate intermediate input (equation (17)). The price of 
value added in the production for investment is computed in equation (18). 
  s s s QDUINV ivauinv QVAUINV =  (16) 
  s s s QDUINV intuinv QINTAUINV =  (17) 
  ()
() s s s s s
s s s s s
QINTAUINV PINTA QVAUINV tivauinv PVA
QDUINV REGAUINV tiibbuinv tauinv PUINV
+ +




Export use block 
Domestic production for export is also a Leontief function of value added (equation (19)) and 
an aggregate intermediate input (equation (20)). The price of value added in the production 
for export is computed in equation (21). In this case, the activity tax corresponds to the export 
tax. 
  s s s QDUEXP ivauexp QVAUEXP =  (19) 
  s s s QDUEXP intuexp QINTAUEXP =  (20) 
  ()
() s s s s s
s s s s s
QINTAUEXP PINTA QVAUEXP tivauexp PVA
QDUEXP REGAUEXP tiibbuexp tauexp PUEXP
+ +
= − − −
1
1
 (21)   -37-
Imports block 
The rest of the world produces goods demanded by the domestic economy (i.e., imports) and 
the rest of the world itself by using only one production factor denominated FSTAR. Equation 
(22) and (23) are the FOC of the cost minimization problem solved by the foreign firms. 
  s s s s QMTOT PM QFSTAR WFSTAR =  (22) 
  s s QMTOT QFSTAR =  (23) 
Household consumption of goods block 
Equations (24) and (25) are the FOC for the cost minimization problem solved by the 
households in order to “compose” their consumption aggregate according to a Cobb-Douglas 
utility function The households distinguish between domestic and imported goods according 
to a CES function (equations (26) to (29)).
17 Equation (27) is the tangency condition that 
determines the quantities of domestic and imported commodities consumed by the 
households. Equation (29) computes the price of the composite Argmington good demanded 
by household h as a weighted average of the domestic and imported prices of the same good.
18 
When  0
0 > sh QMHHD  and  0
0 > sh QDHHD , the model includes equations (26) and (27). On the 
other hand, if  0
0 = sh QMHHD  or  0
0 = sh QDHHD , the model includes equation (28). 
  ( ) h h h
HHD
sh sh sh QCONHHD td PCONHHD QAHHD PAHHD − = 1 α  (24) 





















sh sh QDHHD QMHHD QAHHD ρ ρ ρ δ δ φ
1
− − − + =  (26) 
                                                 
17 Additionally, the model allows using a Cobb-Douglas function to produce the Armington composite good 
demanded by the households. 
18 Notice that the domestic/imported composition of the Armington good is not the same for all the agents in the 






























  sh sh sh QDHHD QMHHD QAHHD + =  (28) 
  () sh s sh sh sh s sh sh QDHHD PUFIN QMHHD tivamhhd tmhhd PM QAHHD PAHHD + + + = 1 (29) 
Labor-leisure choice block 
Equations (30) and (31) are the FOC of the labor (consumption)-leisure choice problem faced 
by the households; for each factor in flab may exist a leisure demand. Equation (32) defines a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function over consumption and leisure for household h.
19 Equation (33) 
computes the supply of factor flab by household h. Notice that  flab h maxhour ,  is the amount of 
hours of factor flab that hosuehold h has available. 
  h h
CONS
h h h QUTHHD PUTHHD QCONHHD PCONHHD α =  (30) 
  h h
OCIO
flab h flab h flab QUTHHD PUTHHD QLEISURE WF , , α =  (31) 








h QLEISURE QCONHHD QUTHHD
,
,
α α α  (32) 
  flab h flab h flab h QLEISURE maxhour QFACSUP , , , − =  (33) 
Government utility block 
Government utility is “produced” according to a Cobb-Douglas function (equations (34) and 
(35)). The government also differentiates between domestic and imported goods according to 
a CES function (equations (36) and (37)).
20 Equation (38) replaces equations (36) and (37) 
when the government demands a good from only one origin.
21 Equation (39) defines the price 
of the Armington composite good consumed by the government. 
                                                 
19 Additionally, the model allows using a CES utility function to model the labor-leisure choice. 
20 Additionally, the model allows using a Cobb-Douglas function to produce the Armington composite good 
demanded by the government. 
21 This is the case in the Argentina SAM used to calibrate the model.   -39-
When 0
0 > QMGOV  and  0
0 > QDGOV , the model includes equations (37) and (37). 
Alternatively, if  0
0 = QMGOV  or  0
0 = QDGOV , the model includes equation (38). 
  QUTGOV PUTGOV QAGOV PAGOV
GOV
s s s . α =  (34) 




















s s QDGOV QMGOV QAGOV ρ ρ ρ δ δ φ
1






























  s s s QDINVG QMINVG QAINVG + =  (38) 
  () s s s s s s s s QDGOV PUFIN QMGOV tivamgov tmgov PM QAGOV PAGOV + + + = 1  (39) 
Private investment (capital good) production block 
Private investment (i.e., demanded by the households and the rest of the world) is produced 
by combining the different goods using a Cobb-Douglas production function (equations (40) 
and (41)).
22 Also in this case, imperfect substitutability between domestic and imported 
varieties of the same good is assumed (equations (42) to (45)).
23 When only one variety of the 
good is demanded, equations (42) and (43) are replaced by equation (44). 
  QUTINV PUTINV QAINV PAINV
INV
s s s . α =  (40) 






α β  (41) 













s s QDINV QMINV QAINV ρ ρ ρ δ δ φ
1
− − − + =  (42) 
                                                 
22 Additionally, a fixed coefficients function can be used. 






























  () s s s s s QDINV QMINV tivaminv tminv QAINV + + + = 1  (44) 
  () s s s s s s s s QDINV PUINV QMINV tivaminv tminv PM QAINV PAINV + + + = 1  (45) 
Public investment (capital good) production block 
Public investment is modeled similarly to the private investment (equations (46) to (51)). 
When a good is only domestic or imported, equations (48) and (49) are replaced by equation 
(50). 
  QUTINVG PUTINVG QAINVG PAINVG
INVG
s s s . α =  (46) 






















s s QDINVG QMINVG QAINVG ρ ρ ρ δ δ φ
1
− − − + =  (48) 





























  s s s QDINVG QMINVG QAINVG + =  (50) 
  () s s s s s s s s QDINVG PUINV QMINVG tivaminvg tminvg PM QAINVG PAINVG + + + = 1 (51) 
Rest of the world utility block 
Equations (52) and (53) show that the rest of the world has a Cobb-Douglas utility function. 
Notice that the rest of the world consumes the domestic (i.e., exports) and imported varieties 
of each good. Goods are distinguished between tradable (set st) and non-tradable (set snt). For 
the former, the rest of the world is indifferent between its own production (i.e, imports) and 
the domestic production (i.e., exports). Consequently, the export price for tradable goods is 
fixed at the world price (equations (54) and (55)). For the non-tradable goods, it is assumed 
that the rest of the world differentiates between the domestic and foreign varieties of the same   -41-
good using a CES function (equations (56) and (57)).
24 Equation (58) computes the price of 
each Armington composite good consumed by the rest of the world. 
  QUTROW PUTROW QAROW PAROW
ROW
s s s . α =  (52) 






α β  (53) 
for tradable goods (st), 
  st st st QMROW QDROW QAROW + =  (54) 
  st st PUEXP PM =  (55) 














snt snt QDROW QMROW QAROW ρ ρ ρ δ δ φ
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for all goods s, 
  s s s s s s QDROW PUEXP QMROW PM QAROW PAROW + =  (58) 
Households bond savings block 
The households “produce” their portfolio of financial savings by combining bonds issued by 
the government and the rest of the world using a Cobb-Douglas technology (equations (59) 
and (60)). 
  h h
HBOND
bh bh b D QBONDTOTHH D PBONDTOTHH QBONDHHD PBOND α =  (59) 






bh QBONDHHD D QBONDTOTHH
α β  (60) 
                                                 
24 Alternatively, a Leontief function can be used.   -42-
Government bond savings block 
Similarly to the households, the government financial savings is a Cobb-Douglas function of 
the bonds issued by the households and the rest of the world (equations (61) and (62)). 
  V QBONDTOTGO V PBONDTOTGO QBONDGOV PBOND
GBOND
b b b . α =  (61) 





b QBONDGOV V QBONDTOTGO
α β  (62) 
Rest of the world bond savings block 
The rest of the world also “produces” its financial savings by combining bonds issued by the 
households and the government using a Cobb-Douglas function (equations (63) and (64)). 

















b QBONDROW W QBONDTOTRO
α β  (64) 
Households budget constraint block 
Households spend fixed shares of their income in (utility) consumption (equation (65)), 
investment (equation (66)), and bonds (equation (67)). Equation (68) shows that the (full; i.e., 
including leisure) income of household h is the sum of factorial income, the value of leisure, 
the value of the issued bonds, the transfers received from the government, and the transfers 
received or made as a consequence of the regulatory regime if the household is the owner of 
the physical capital in the regulated sectors. Notice that the factorial income is computed as 
the supply excluding unemployment ( f U ) times the factor net price. Notice that households 
consume the “utility” good produced in equation (32). 
  h h h h YHHD shrhcon QUTHHD PUTHHD =  (65) 
  h h h YHHD shrhinv QINVHHD PUTINV = .  (66) 
  h h h h YHHD shrhbond D QBONDTOTHH D PBONDTOTHH =  (67)   -43-
 
( )
























Government budget constraint block 
The government spends a fixed proportions of its income in consumption (equation (69)), 
investment (equation (70)), bonds (equation (71)), and transfers to the households (equation 
(72)). The government income is the sum of tax revenue, factorial income, income from the 
issued bonds, and transfers received or made as a consequence of the regulatory regime when 
the government is owner of physical capital in regulated sectors (equation (73)). In order to 
model the transfers from the government to the households, it is assumed that the latter have 
an endowment of the good QGTRAN demanded only by the former.  
The variables FIXGCON, FIXGINV and FIXGBOND are used to choose between alternative 
closure rules for the government. When they are fixed and equal to zero, all the government 
demands are endogenous. When they are flexible and QUTGOV ,  QINVGOV  and 
V QBONDTOTGO  are fixed, any increase in the government income will be transferred to the 
households. However, the government will have to finance any change in the price of 
QUTGOV ,  QINVGOV  and  V QBONDTOTGO . This last closure rule was used in the 
computation of the MCPF. Notice that the variables FIXGCON, FIXGINV and FIXGBOND 
can be seen as tax rates that generate tax revenue collected by the government (equation 
(73)).
25 
  () YGOV shrgcon QUTGOV FIXGCON PUTGOV . 1 = +  (69) 
  () YGOV shrginv QINVGOV FIXGINV PUTINVG . 1 = +  (70) 
                                                 
25 This formulation is equivalent to fixing the variables QUTGOV , QINVGOV  and  V QBONDTOTGO  
at the same time that equations (69), (70) and (71) are dropped from the model.   -44-
  () YGOV shrgbond V QBONDTOTGO FIXGBOND V PBONDTOTGO . 1 = +  (71) 
































Rest of the world budget constraint block 
The rest of the world spends fixed shares of its income in consumption (equation (74)), 
investment (equation (75)), and bonds savings (equation (76)). The income of the rest of the 
world is computed as the sum of factorial income including factor FSTAR, the income from 
the issued bonds, and the transfers that receives or makes as a consequence of the regulatory 
regime if the rest of the world is the owner of physical capital in the regulated sectors 
(equation (77)). 
  YROW shrfcon QUTROW PUTROW . . =  (74) 
  YROW shrfinv QINVROW PUTINV . . =  (75) 
  YROW shrfbond W QBONDTOTRO W PBONDTOTRO . . =  (76) 
 
( )
() TRANREGF TRANREGA shrtranreg W QFSTARENDO WFSTAR





f f row f
+ + +




Tax revenue block 
This block has only one equation that computes the total tax revenue. The model identifies the 
following tax instruments: factor tax use, production tax for the different uses, value added 
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Specific factor block 
Equation (79) computes the average wage of the sector-specific factors. The average wage 


















  fespec f ∈  (79) 
Unemployment block 
This block comprises the equations that allow to assume the existence of unemployment with 
a minimum real wage (i.e., the real wage is downward rigid). Equation (80) defines the 
consumer price index.
26 Equation (81) defines a consumer price index that only includes 
domestic goods; the weights are computed as the share of each good in final consumption. 
Equation (82) defines the real wage. Equation (83) computes the unemployment rate as the 
ratio between the unemployed and the labor supply. Equations (84) and (85) set a lower 
bound for the real wage and unemployment rate, respectively. Finally, equation (86) is a 
complementarity relation that allows considering two regimes in the market of the factor with 
unemployment: i) the real wage is equal to the minimum and there is unemployment, or ii) the 
real wage is above the minimum and there is no unemployment. When the initial 
unemployment is zero (i.e., full employment is assumed), equation (86) holds always by 
making zero the unemployment. 
  ∑ =
sh
sh shPAHHD cwtsarming CPIARMING  (80) 
  ∑ =
s















U  (83) 
 
0
f f WFREAL WFREAL ≥  (84) 
                                                 
26 Notice that, as a consequence of assuming that the domestic/imported composition varies between households, 
each household faces a different price PAHHD(s,h).    -47-
  0 ≥ f QUNEMP  (85) 
  ( ) 0
0 = − f f f QUNEMP WFREAL WFREAL  (86) 
Equilibrium conditions block 
This block contains all the equilibrium conditions in the model. They equate the supply and 
demand in the different markets. Equations (87) and (88) refer to the market of the factor used 
in the production of domestic and imported goods, respectively. Equation (89) shows the 
equality between the supply of value added and the sum of the value added demands for the 
different uses of the domestic production. Equation (90) is similar to the previous one but 
refers to intermediate inputs. Equation (91) is the equilibrium condition in the market for 
imports. Notice that the demand for imports of the rest of the world is included. Equations 
(92) to (95) are the equilibrium conditions in the markets for domestic production. For 
example, equation (95) shows that the domestic production for exports ( s QDUEXP ) is equal 
to the demand for domestic production by the rest of the world ( s QDROW ). Equations (96) 
and (97) equate the supply and demand of private and public investment, respectively. 
Equation (98) is the equilibrium condition in the market for bond b. Finally, equation (99) 
equates the supply and demand of transfers from the government to the rest of institutions 
included in the model. 




fs QFACSUP QUNEMP QF  (87) 
  ∑ =
s
s QFSTAR W QFSTARENDO  (88) 
  s s s s s QVAUEXP QVAUINV QVAUFIN QVAUINT QVA + + + =  (89) 
  s s s s s QINTAUEXP QINTAUINV QINTAUFIN QINTAUINT QINTA + + + =  (90) 




ss s QMROW QMINV QMGOV QMHHD QMINT QMTOT + + + + = ∑ ∑
'
'  (91) 
  s
s
ss QDUINT QDINT = ∑
'
'  (92) 
  s s
h
sh QDUFIN QDGOV QDHHD = + ∑  (93)   -48-
  s s s QDUINV QDINVG QDINV = +  (94) 
  s s QDUEXP QDROW =  (95) 
  QINVROW QINVHHD QUTINV
h
h + =∑  (96) 
  QINVGOV QUTINVG =  (97) 




ib QBONDROW QBONDGOV QBONDHHD QBONDENDOW + + =∑ ∑  (98) 
  ∑ =
i
i W QGTRANENDO QGTRAN  (99) 
Regulation block 
Equations (100) and (101) are used to compute the transfer (i.e., implicit tax revenue) 
necessary to regulate the price of good s and the wage of factor f in sector s, respectively. 
These transfers are part of the income of institutions (see equations (68), (73) and (77)). 
Notice that the value of those transfers can be negative. Equations (102) to (105) compute the 
price in terms of the CPI of the different possible uses for each good. When a sector is 
regulated by price-cap, those prices are kept constant. Equation (106) defines the real wage of 
factor f in the sector s. Equations (107) to (111) are used to define the regulated real prices in 
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QDUINT PUINT REGAUINT TRANREGA
 (101) 
  s s PUINT CPIARMING PUINTREAL =  (102) 
  s s PUFIN CPIARMING PUFINREAL =  (103)   -49-
  s s PUINV CPIARMING PUINVREAL =  (104) 
  s s PUEXP CPIARMING PUEXPREAL =  (105) 
  fs fs WFDIF CPIARMING WFDIFREAL =  (106) 
  s s PUINT WFSTAR R PUINTWFSTA =  (107) 
  s s PUFIN WFSTAR R PUFINWFSTA =  (108) 
  s s PUINV WFSTAR R PUINVWFSTA =  (109) 
  s s PUEXP WFSTAR R PUEXPWFSTA =  (110) 
  fs fs WFDIF WFSTAR R WFDIFWFSTA =  (111) 
Regulated sectors 
The model considers two alternative regulatory regimes: price cap, and cost-plus or rate of 
return regulation. In the first case, the real price (i.e., in terms of the CPI) of the regulated 
good is fixed at the same time that the variables REGAUINT(reg), REGAUFIN(reg), 
REGAUINV(reg) y REGAUEXP(reg) are flexible. In the second case, the real wage of the 
physical capital in the regulated sector is fixed at the same time that the variable 
REGF(fcap,reg) is flexible. In both cases, the variables REGAUINT(reg), REGAUFIN(reg), 
REGAUINV(reg) and REGAUEXP(reg), and REGF(fcap,reg) operate as (implicit) taxes that 
generate a tax revenue that is collected by the owners (households, government, rest of the 
world) ofthe physical capital in the regulated sectors. Notice that the tax collection can be 
negative (i.e., subsidy).  
Closure rule 
Assuming that all goods are tradable, the model has the following dimensions in terms of 
variables and equations. 
s s x s b b x h f f x s h x f h i x b s x h 1
V a r i a b l e s 5 1441452924 3 0
E q u a t i o n s4 7431432814 2 5
D i f f e r e n c e 40100201105    -50-
In order to have a square model with the same number of variables and equations, it is 
necessary to fix the value of 4 s + b + 2 (f x s) + h + (i x b) + 5 variables. We select the 
following:  s REGAUINT ,  s REGAUFIN ,  s REGAUINV  y  s REGAUEXP  when there are no 
sectors regulated by price-cap;  fs REGF  when there are no sectors regulated by the rate of 
return on physical capital;  fs WFDIF  for the mobile factors between sectors and  fs QF  for the 
sector-specific factors;  if QFSUP  (includes unemployment) for the institutions different from 
the households that do not face a labor-leisure choice and  W QFSTARENDO  so that factor 
endowments are fixed;  h W QGTRANENDO  so that the share of each household in the 
government transfers is fixed;  ib QBONDENDOW  so that the endowment of bonds b of each 
institution i is fixed;  b FIXBONDROW  in order to have a flexible demand for bonds by the 
rest of the world; and QUTGOV ,  QINVGOV  and  V QBONDTOTGO  in order to fix the 
government demand for goods, investment, and bonds. 
The model numeraire is the factor FSTAR that the rest of the world employs to produce 
imports; its wage is fixed at one. Then, by virtue of Walras law, an equation can be dropped 
from the model. Alternatively, an endogenous variable (i.e., WALRAS) can be added to the 
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